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THE FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING
AMENDMENTS ACT
Robert L. Schonfeld*
Introduction
Congress amended the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act
('Fair Housing Act') in 1988 "to end the unnecessary exclusion of
persons with handicaps from the American mainstream."' To that
end, Congress defined prohibited housing discrimination against
people with disabilities as, among other actions, "a refusal to make
reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services,
when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such per-
son equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."2
As the United States Supreme Court has held, the Fair Housing
Act has a "broad and inclusive" compass requiring a "generous
construction."'3 However, many federal courts have narrowly inter-
preted the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the Fair Housing
Act in conflict with both Congressional intent and the Supreme
* Partner, Stein and Schonfeld, Garden City, New York. Member of New York
and District of Columbia Bars. B.S. 1974, Cornell University, J.D. 1977, Fordham
University. The author was the Research Editor of the Fordham Urban Law Journal,
Volume V, 1976-77. This article is a sequel to the author's three previous articles in
this journal, Robert L. Schonfeld, "Not in My Neighborhood: Legal Challenges to the
Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State,
13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985); Robert L. Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred-Year Flood
Plains" and Other Unconstitutional Challenges to the Establishment of Community
Residences for the Mentally Retarded, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1988); and Robert L.
Schonfeld and Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal "Tag-Team": The Federal Fair Hous-
ing Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Access to Housing for Persons with
Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299 (1994).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Beth Pepper and Seth P. Stein
on this article.
1. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2179 [hereinafter HousE REPORT]. For other articles on the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act, see Robert L. Schonfeld and Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal
"Tag-Team": The Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Ac-
cess to Housing for Persons with Disabilities, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 299 (1994);
Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own, the FHAA of 1988 and Housing Discrimi-
nation Against People With Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925 (1994); Laurie
C. Malkin, Trouble at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and
Group Homes for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
3. City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995).
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Court's mandate that the statute be given a "generous construc-
tion."4 Some courts have interpreted the terms "necessary" and
"equal opportunity" in a manner that nullifies the "reasonable ac-
commodation" clause of the statute.' These court decisions have
permitted landlords and municipalities to exclude people with disa-
bilities from housing.
This Article examines recent Federal court decisions interpreting
the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the Fair Housing Act
and proposes an interpretation of the clause that is consistent with
both the language of the statute and the intent of its drafters. Part
I explores the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act and, in
particular, the "reasonable accommodation" clause of the statute.
This Part also examines the 1995 United States Supreme Court de-
cision City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. which explains how
the statute should be interpreted as well as the Supreme Court's
decision interpreting the phrase "reasonable accommodation." As
this Part demonstrates, both Congress and the Supreme Court in-
tended the statute be used to promote housing for people with dis-
abilities and not be used as a barrier to housing. In addition, they
intended that a "reasonable accommodation" be made except
where the accommodation would constitute a substantial hardship,
undue burden, or fundamental alteration of a program.
Part II examines the provisions of the Federal Fair Housing Act
and the way they are used to attack housing discrimination against
people with disabilities. This Part discusses in detail the "reason-
able accommodation" clause of the statute and explores the earlier
federal district court cases interpreting the "reasonable accommo-
dation" standard.
Part III discusses some of the issues from recent cases brought
under the "reasonable accommodation" prong of the statute. This
Part examines whether people with disabilities and housing provid-
ers must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to litiga-
tion, as well as which parties - people with disabilities and
housing providers or municipalities and landlords - have the bur-
den of proof in a "reasonable accommodation" case. This Part
also explores the recent narrow Federal court interpretations of the
terms "reasonable," "necessity," and "equal opportunity" that
4. See, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597
(4th Cir. 1997); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997);
Elderhaven v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Village of
Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996).
5. Id.
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have hindered the use of the statute to fight housing discrimination
against people with disabilities.
Part IV demonstrates how the "reasonable accommodation"
clause of the statute can be interpreted so that it comports with the
intention of its drafters and the United States Supreme Court. It
also considers an expanded use of the other prongs of the Fair
Housing Act as well as the use of the Americans With Disabilities
Act in land use disputes.
I. The History of the Fair Housing Act and
"Reasonable Accommodation"
In 1968, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act 6 to prohibit
housing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion and na-
tional origin7 and, in 1974, expanded the law to cover sex discrimi-
nation.8 Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 19739 to
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities in federally-
funded programs.' 0 However, it was not until 1988 that Congress
enacted the Fair Housing Act1' which placed disability discrimina-
tion on the same footing as discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, and sex.12
This Part first examines the report of the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives ("the Report"), especially as it re-
lates to the concept of "reasonable accommodation." This part
then explores the Supreme Court cases that have interpreted both
the Fair Housing Act and the concept of "reasonable
accommodation."
A. Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives
The Report supporting the Fair Housing Act enuciates a strong
policy favoring the establishment of housing for people with disa-
bilities in all residential areas. The Report states that the statute
"is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment to end the
6. Pub. L. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1994)).
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 (1994).
8. Pub. L. 93-383, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (1993).
9. Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (Supp.
1997)).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1997).
11. Pub. L. 100-430, § 6(a)-(b)(2), (e), 15, 102 Stat. 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619 (1994)).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
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unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the Ameri-
can mainstream."13 The Report specifically rejects the use of gen-
eralized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded speculations
about threats to safety as grounds to exclude people with disabili-
ties from residential neighborhoods. 4
The Report recognizes several types of municipal ordinances
that exclude people with disabilities. First, health, safety, or land-
use requirements on congregate living arrangements among non-
related persons with disabilities violate the statute since such re-
quirements are not imposed on other families and non-related
groups of similar size. 15 Similarly, the statute was intended to pro-
hibit the use of special requirements through land use regulations,
restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that
have the effect of limiting the ability of people with disabilities "to
live in the residence of their choice in the community."' 6 Finally,
the Report states that neutral rules and regulations on health,
safety and land-use may violate the statute whether they are based
on false or over-protective assumptions about the needs of people
with disabilities or on unfounded fears or difficulties about the
problems their residency in the community may pose.17
The Report further notes that a reasonable accommodation must
be made when necessary to permit people with disabilities to live in
a dwelling of their choice. 8 The Report states that the concept of
"reasonable accommodation" has a long history in regulations and
case law dealing with discrimination on the basis of handicap, citing
a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of
1973."9 According to the Report, a discriminatory rule is not de-
fensible simply because it has become a tradition. The Report
notes that the "reasonable accommodation" provision of the stat-
ute requires changes to traditional rules and practices if necessary
to permit a person with disabilities an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.2"
As a whole, the Report expresses a policy prohibiting legal barri-
ers that inhibits people with disabilities from residing in dwellings
13. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2179.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 2185.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 2186.
19. Id. The HOUSE REPORT cited to Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397 (1979), and 45 C.F.R. § 84.12.
20. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2186.
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of their choice. This policy also suggests that the statute be con-
strued liberally in favor of housing for people with disabilities.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fair Housing Act
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.21 , the Supreme Court
interpreted the Fair Housing Act. This case may indicate how that
Court will interpret future Fair Housing Act cases.
In City of Edmonds the issue for the Court was whether a munic-
ipal zoning ordinance limiting the number of unrelated people who
could be considered a "family" for zoning purposes constituted
"any reasonable local, State or Federal restrictions regarding the
maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. 22
If the municipal ordinance was a restriction on the "maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling," the ordi-
nance would have been exempt from the Fair Housing Act. The
municipality could then have excluded a home for recovering al-
coholics and substance abusers which housed more than five unre-
lated people. 3
The United States Supreme Court held in City of Edmonds that
the ordinance was not a restriction on the "maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling" and thus was not ex-
empt from the Fair Housing Act.24 The Court held that the type of
restriction exempt from the statute was rules aimed at preventing
overcrowding. The exemption does not include family composition
rules aimed at limiting the number of unrelated people living to-
gether in a residential neighborhood that are not applicable to all
families.2 5
In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the statute had a
"broad and inclusive" compass requiring a "generous construc-
21. 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
22. Id. at 728, 731 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1994)).
"The Fair Housing Act exempts from coverage "any reasonable local, State or Federal
restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling." Id.
23. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Edmonds, courts were split on
the issue of whether a "family composition" ordinance was exempt under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3607(b)(1). In Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh
Circuit held that such ordinances were exempt from the Fair Housing Act. On the
other hand, the Ninth Circuit in City of Edmonds, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994), and the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Oxford House, Inc. v. City of
Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993), held that such ordinances were not
exempt from the Fair Housing Act.
24. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 734-35.
25. See id.
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tion," and that the statute's exception was to be read "narrowly in
order to preserve the primary operation of the [policy]. '26 The
Court further recognized that the Fair Housing Act required rea-
sonable accommodations to afford people with disabilities an equal
opportunity to use and enjoy housing.27 The Supreme Court's de-
cision clearly comports with the intentions of the drafters of the
statute.2 8
In confirming the findings of previous decisions, the Court noted
in City of Edmonds that land use restrictions aim to prevent
problems caused by "the pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard"
and to encourage "family values, youth values, and the blessings of
26. Id. at 731 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209,
212 (1972)). While the Supreme Court does afford a "generous construction" to the
Fair Housing Act, it did not find that the municipality's code or actions were them-
selves discriminatory. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 731 n.4. Instead, the Court con-
fined itself to the narrow issue before it. The decision in City of Edmonds should be
compared to the Court's previous case involving zoning an group housing for people
with disabilities. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, 473 U.S. 432
(1985). There, the Supreme Court condemned the municipality's decision to zone out
a home for people with mental disabilities as being discriminatory and prejudicially
based. See id. at 450. Justice Marshall's concurrence in City of Cleburne also details
the history of discrimination against people with disabilities in the Untied States. See
also id. at 455-78. For other law review analysis of City of Edmonds, see Stephen C.
Hall, City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc: A Comment on the Continuing Vitality of
Single-Family Zoning Restrictions, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 829 (1996).
27. See City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 737.
28. The Supreme Court cited the HOUSE REPORT in support of its conclusion. See
City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 734 n.8. The Supreme Court's decision also demon-
strates the power of the Fair Housing Act and its ability to make uniform the rights of
people with disabilities throughout the country. Had the Fair Housing Act not ex-
isted, a challenge to the ordinance under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
would have failed. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (finding that
a "family composition" ordinance did not violate Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution). Assuming that City of Edmonds is federally funded, there
would have been a question as to whether the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 would have
applied. Compare Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Center, 815 F.2d 1343
(10th Cir. 1987) and Brecker v. Queens B'nai Brith Housing Development Fund Co.,
607 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd 798 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the
Rehabilitation Act did not require reasonable accommodation to permit housing for
people with disabilities) with City Wide Associates v. Penfield, 564 N.E.2d 1003
(Mass. 1992); Schuett Inn. Co. v. Anderson, 386 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. App. 1986) (hold-
ing that the Rehabilitation Act could require reasonable accommodation for people
with disabilities in federally funded housing) and Crossroads Apartments Associates
v. LeBoo, 152 Misc.2d 830, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. City Ct. 1991). In some states,
the ordinances involved in City of Edmonds would have been deemed to be violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Sate constitution. See City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980); Charter Township v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831
(Mich. 1984); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368 (N.J. 1979); McMinn v. Town of Oyster
Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544 (1985).
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quiet seclusion and clean air."2 9 If the housing proposal does not
constitute the proverbial pig and does not negatively impact on the
abovementioned values, seclusion, and air, the housing must be
permitted.
C. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of "Reasonable
Accommodation"
In its report, the House Judiciary Committee noted that the con-
cept of "reasonable accommodation ... has a long history in regu-
lations and case law dealing with discrimination on the basis of
handicap. 3 ° In writing this, the House cited31 to Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 32 a Supreme Court case interpreting
the expression "reasonable modification" under a regulation en-
acted to interpret the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Under this regulation, a school receiving federal funds was re-
quired to change its academic requirements to ensure such require-
ments do not discriminate against students on the basis of their
disabilities.33 In Davis, a student with a serious hearing disability
challenged the requirements of a college's nursing program as vio-
lative of the Rehabilitation Act. 34 The student alleged that the col-
lege was required to undertake affirmative action that would
dispense with the need for effective oral communication.3 5
The Supreme Court held that the student's request was not a
reasonable modification of the school's nursing program, and that
the school was not required to change its program.36 The Court
found that since the student was unable to function in clinical
29. City of Edmonds, 514 U.S. at 732-33.
30. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2186.
31. Id.
32. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
33. See id. at 408 n.9 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978)). The Code of Federal Regu-
lations requires a school receiving federal funding to "make such modification to its
academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not dis-
criminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against a qual-
ified handicapped applicant or student." 45 C.F.R. § 84.44. While Southeastern
Community College was brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the substan-
tive portions of that statute do not refer to a requirement that a school make a "rea-
sonable accommodation." Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 400; see also
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1997). However, the "remedies and attorneys fees" portion of
the statute states that a court in fashioning a remedy "may take into account the
reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the avail-
ability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equi-
table an appropriate remedy." 29 U.S.C. § 794a (a)(1) (1985).
34. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 407-09.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 410-12.
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courses without close supervision, the college could only allow her
to take academic classes and that such change would be a "funda-
mental alteration in the nature of a program," rather than a modifi-
cation of the program.37 The Court noted that in some instances,
however, changes could be made in programs without imposing un-
due financial and administrative burdens on a State. In those situa-
tions, a refusal to modify an existing program might become
unreasonable and discriminatory.38
Therefore, between City of Edmonds and Davis, the Supreme
Court has spoken on how to interpret the Fair Housing Act and the
expression "reasonable accommodation." In City of Edmonds, the
Supreme Court has said that the Fair Housing Act should be given
a generous interpretation. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that a
reasonable modification is one that does not fundamentally alter a
program or impose an undue financial and administrative burden
on a government. Additionally, in City of Edmonds, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the purpose of land use restrictions is to pre-
vent the "pig in the parlor" and to promote "family values."
Interpreting City of Edmonds and Davis together, housing for
people with disabilities may only fundamentally alter a zoning
scheme where it causes substantial identifiable problems for a com-
munity or somehow destroys family and youth values, seclusion,
and clean air. This interpretation is consistent with that of the
drafters of the statute as enunciated in the House Report.
II. The Elements of a Fair Housing Act Case
Courts use four tests to determine whether a violation of the
statute has occurred. Under the first test, called either "intentional
discrimination" or "discriminatory treatment," a person with a dis-
ability must prove that the alleged violator intentionally acted to
deprive people with disabilities of housing because of their disabil-
37. Id.
38. See id. The sentence in the decision stating that "such advances also may en-
able attainment of these goals without imposing undue financial and administrative
burdens upon a State," id. at 412, is the source for all subsequent cases that examined
whether a "reasonable accommodation" or "reasonable requirement" is required.
The "reasonable accommodation" requirement is also present in the Americans With
Disabilities Act. That law requires employers, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(1995), and
public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(2) (1995), to make reasonable ac-
commodations to people with disabilities unless they would impose "an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business of such covered entity" or would "fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommo-
dations" or would result in "an undue burden." 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iii)
(1995).
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ity.39 The second test, a form of intentional discrimination, is called
"facial discrimination" and involves statutes and ordinances that
on their face treat people with disabilities differently from other
people. 0 The third test, known as the "disparate impact" test, re-
quires a showing that the discriminatory conduct, though seemingly
neutral, has had a "disparate impact" on a person because of their
disability.41 The fourth test is the "reasonable accommodation"
test.42
This Part first presents an overview of the elements of an "inten-
tional discrimination," "facial discrimination," and "disparate im-
pact" cases. It then discusses the elements of a "reasonable
accommodation" case in more detail and discusses some of the ear-
lier federal district court decisions that applied the "reasonable ac-
commodation" test. This Part demonstrates the significance of the
"reasonable accommodation" test in assuring that people with dis-
abilities are not excluded from the American mainstream.
A. "Intentional Discrimination," "Facial Discrimination," and
"Disparate Impact"
Intentional discrimination occurs when a municipality deprives
people with disabilities of housing because of their disabilities.
Thus, the disabilities of the residents form the basis for the
decision."3
However, as one court has held, "clever men easily conceal their
intentions."44 While occasionally cases have been won based upon
39. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 790 (6th Cir.
1996); United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987);
Epicenter of Steubenville v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp., 845, 851 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
40. See, e.g., Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Serv., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir.
1996); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1500-01 (9th Cir. 1995); Children's
Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Alliance for the
Mentally Ill v. City of Naperville, 923 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. I11. 1996); see also
Marburnak v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47-48 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying same ration-
ale); ARC of N.J., Inc. v. State of N.J., 950 F. Supp. 637, 645 (D. N.J. 1996); Potomac
Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1297-1300 (D. Md.
1993).
41. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
934-36 (2d Cir.), affd 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819
F. Supp. 1179, 1182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994). See, e.g., Hovsons v. Township of Brick, 89
F.3d 1096, 1103-06 (3d Cir. 1996); Proviso Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. Village of
Westchester, 914 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934-36 (quot-
ing United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (1974)).
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discriminatory statements made by town officials,4 5 most inten-
tional discrimination cases are proven by circumstantial evidence
demonstrating that procedures or substantive criteria were
changed by a municipality in response to neighborhood opposition
for the purpose of limiting housing. In such cases, courts examine
the historical background of the municipality, the sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision, departures from nor-
mal procedural sequences, and departures from substantive crite-
46ria. Because of the need to rely upon circumstantial evidence, an
intentional discrimination case is often difficult to prove.
Courts have considered challenges to laws placing special re-
quirements' on housing for people with disabilities to be a type of
intentional discrimination action known as a "facial discrimina-
tion" action.4" In a facial discrimination action, the burden of
proof is on the municipality to demonstrate that the special and
unique needs the individuals warrant the imposition of special
safety requirements.48 While several cases have succeeded in strik-
ing ordinances placing special safety requirements on people with
disabilities, this cause of action does not apply to neutral statutes
and ordinances challenged in many actions.49
With regard to "disparate impact" cases, a person with a disabil-
ity or a housing provider must demonstrate that the challenged
practice "actually or predictably results" in discrimination. 50 This
45. See, e.g., United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J.
1991), affd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting a municipal official who said that he
wanted to "oversee a conference of the policy community ... so that we tag-team the
individual [owner of residence for people with disabilities] through the respective
Borough officials); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732-33 (S.D. Ill.
1989) (holding that a municipal decision to exclude home for people with AIDS based
on undocumented statements about AIDS constituted intentional discrimination in
violation of statute).
46. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. Of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221-24 (2d Cir.
1987); see also Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Water-
ford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 1.33-35 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that a village ordinance en-
acted for purpose of excluding housing for people with AIDS was a form of
intentional discrimination); Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan and Zon-
ing Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1210-16 (D. Conn. 1992) (finding intentional discrimi-
nation where municipality changed its substantive and procedural requirements in
response to neighborhood opposition to stop housing for people with AIDS).
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500-01 (holding that the disparate impact and rea-
sonable accommodation tests apply to neutral ordinances and only intentional dis-
crimination and facial discrimination apply to non-neutral laws).
50. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d
Cir.), affd in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
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means that the conduct of the alleged discriminatory party is more
harshly felt on people with handicaps than those without.51 Once a
prima facie disparate impact case has been established, a munici-
pality must demonstrate that its actions furthered, in theory and in
practice, a legitimate bona fide governmental interest and that no
alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory
effect.52
However, some courts have limited the use of the "disparate im-
pact" test. One circuit court has held that the test cannot be ap-
plied to an individual instance of discrimination.53 As most cases
center around individual instances of discrimination, this interpre-
tation virtually eliminates the use of the test.
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that statistics are required in a
disparate impact case to demonstrate that the challenged practice
has a greater impact on people with disabilities than non-disabled
people.54 Statistics are not always available, and this requirement
makes it difficult to prove some cases involving people with
disabilities.
Regardless, to demonstrate disparate impact, the plaintiff must
show that a discriminatory practice has a greater detrimental effect
on people with disabilities than non-disabled people. That level of
evidence would appear to be considerably more than that required
under the "reasonable accommodation" test.
B. The "Reasonable Accommodation" Test and the Early
Cases Interpreting "Reasonable Accommodation
To prevail on a "reasonable accommodation" claim, a person
with a disability must demonstrate that (1) a request for an accom-
modation was made, (2) such request was either ignored or denied,
(3) the accommodation was necessary to enable the person an
equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling of that person's
choice, and (4) the accommodation was reasonable. The "rea-
sonable accommodation" test requires neither a showing of intent
or facial discrimination, nor does it require proof that a discrimina-
51. Cf. Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (citing Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 933).
52. See id. at 936.
53. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County Maryland, 911 F. Supp. 918, 931
(D. Md. 1996), affd 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1981)).
54. See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994); see also Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at
597.
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tory practice has a greater impact on people with disabilities than
on non-disabled people. Therefore, it appears easier to prove a
case under the "reasonable accommodation" standard than under
the other standards.
In the earlier "reasonable accommodation" cases decided shortly
after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act, courts largely ex-
amined whether the proposed housing would be harmful to either
the neighborhood or the proposed residents. It is generally as-
sumed that an accommodation was necessary to enable the resi-
dents an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling of that
person's choice. 56 For example, in United States v. City of Philadel-
phia,57 the court ordered a municipality to make a reasonable ac-
commodation in its ordinance requiring that all rear yards must
have a certain specified footage. 8 The court held as such because
municipal officials admitted that the rear yard of the house in ques-
tion did provide free access to light and air, access to firefighters,
and room for recreation, and that there was no danger of substan-
tial harm to the municipality.59 The court in City of Philadelphia
also determined that a nexus was not required between the barrier
to proposed housing and the disability of the proposed residents.6 °
Similarly, in Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,61 a court
applied the "reasonable accommodation" to enjoin a municipality
from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting transients from living in a
residential area.62 The court found that since the residence did not
have a negative impact on the area and did not cause an undue
administrative or financial hardship on the municipality, the munic-
ipality had to make a reasonable accommodation and not enforce
its ordinance.63 The court in Town of Babylon only considered
whether it was reasonable to permit the residence to continue its
56. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa.
1993), aftd, 30 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819
F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
57. 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 30 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994).
58. See id. at 228-30.
59. See id. at 228.
60. See id. at 229-30. Compare this decision to Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d. at 604,
where the Fourth Circuit held that there had to be a direct linkage between the pro-
posed accommodation and the disability of the person, noting that the requirement
"has attributes of a causation requirement." See also Salute v. Stratford Greens Gar-
den Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that economic discrimination
without regard to disability is not covered by the Fair Housing Act).
61. 819 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
62. See id. at 1185-86.
63. See id. at 1186.
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operation and assumed that the accommodation was necessary.64
Other decisions have similarly considered only the "reasonable-
ness" of the housing involved in requiring municipalities to make a
"reasonable accommodation," and likewise assumed that such ac-
commodation was necessary to provide an equal opportunity.
While these decisions may appear simplistic in their analysis of
"reasonable accommodation," they are reflective of the intentions
of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court than later de-
cisions of several courts. If a municipal zoning law prevented hous-
ing for people with disabilities, an "accommodation" - either a
waiver of the rule or an interpretation of the rule permitting the
housing - was certainly necessary. Similarly, people with disabili-
ties will often need accommodations in local rules to permit them
to be able to live in non-traditional groups. Without such accom-
modations, people with disabilities would not have the same op-
portunities of non-disabled people to live in a residential
neighborhood of their choice.
The aim of the Fair Housing Act was to promote housing for
people with disabilities in residential neighborhoods. In looking
largely to the reasonableness of such housing and presuming right-
fully that the accommodations were necessary, the earlier "reason-
able accommodation" decisions correctly gave the Fair Housing
Act the "generous construction" endorsed by the Supreme Court
in City of Edmonds.
III. Analysis of Recent Circuit Court Decisions Interpreting the
"Reasonable Accommodation" Clause of the Fair
Housing Act
In the past several years, the majority of courts have considered
cases involving whether a "reasonable accommodation" was made
to permit housing for people with disabilities.66 Unfortunately, a
64. See id.; see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Management
Comp., 107 F.3d 1374, 1381 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that causation should pose no
"independent hurdle" in cases where zoning ordinances are used to block housing for
people with disabilities because "the city policies directly interfere with use and en-
joyment because they prevent the housing from being built").
65. See North Shore-Chicago Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 827 F.
Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Horizon House Dev. Servs. Inc. v. Township of Cherry
Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992); United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp.
872 (W.D. Wis. 1991); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp.
1329 (D.N.J. 1991); United Sates v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220
(D. P.R. 1991).
66. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597 (4th
Cir. 1997); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith & Lee
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majority of these cases have taken a much more narrow view of the
"reasonable accommodation" test than that of the earlier
decisions.67
This Part examines and analyzes those decisions, particularly
with regard to the following questions: (1) must a party exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a court action using the "rea-
sonable accommodation" test, (2) which party has the burden of
proof in a reasonable accommodations case, (3) what evidence is
required to demonstrate that an accommodation was "reasonable"
or "unreasonable," (4) what evidence, if any, is required to
demonstrate that an accommodation is "necessary," and (5) what
evidence, if any, is required to demonstrate that an accommodation
would provide an "equal opportunity" for housing for people with
disabilities.
A. Exhaustion of Remedies
The Fair Housing Act is clear that an aggrieved party does not
need to exhaust parallel administrative remedies provided through
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) before commencing a Federal action.6  However,
the courts are divided with regard to whether an aggrieved party
must follow local and state zoning procedures before filing a Fed-
eral action.69 It would seem logical that if an aggrieved party does
Assoc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996); Elderhaven v. City of Lubbock,
98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996); Hovsons v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir.
1996); Brandt v. Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
California Mobile Home Park Management Co., 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir 1997) (dis-
cussing whether a trailer park had to waive a parking fee for an aide serving a person
with a disability residing in the trailer park); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, 51 F.3d 328
(2d Cir. 1995) (questioning whether an apartment complex had to make a reasonable
accommodation to provide a parking space to a person with a disability).
67. See, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597
(4th Cir. 1997).
68. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(B)(2) (1994), an aggrieved person may commence a
civil action whether or not a complaint has been filed with the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. Similarly, in "pattern or practice cases,"
the United States can immediately go to court to challenge an act of discrimination.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1994).
69. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 597 (holding that administrative reme-
dies need not be exhausted); Oxford House-C v. City of St.Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir.
1996) (finding that in the guise of a "ripeness" analysis, administrative remedies must
be exhausted); United States v. City of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994); Hunt-
ington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 394 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Oxford House v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(deciding administrative remedies must be exhausted).
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not need to exhaust HUD remedies before filing a Federal action,
he or she should not have to exhaust local remedies.
Both the Second Circuit in Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v.
Town of Huntington70 and the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods Inn,
Inc. v. Howard County71 correctly held that administrative reme-
dies need not be exhausted before the commencement of a Fair
Housing Act action in federal court, even where the "reasonable
accommodation" test is invoked. Both decisions note that the
drafters of the statute intended administrative remedies to be a pri-
mary and not an exclusive method for seeking redress.72
However, in two very similar cases, the Seventh and Eighth cir-
cuits under the guise of a "ripeness" theory have required housing
providers for people with disabilities to exhaust administrative
remedies before commencing a federal action. In United States v.
Village of Palatine,73 and Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis,74
municipalities had ordinances limiting the number of unrelated
people who could live in a residential neighborhood, and requiring
residences with a greater number of unrelated people to apply for a
special use permit.75 Residences for recovering alcoholics and sub-
stance abusers challenged the ordinances as being discriminatory
under the Fair Housing Act.76 The residences may have been per-
mitted in the zoning district had they applied for a special use per-
mit, but they did not apply for such permits.77
The courts in Village of Palatine78 and City of St. Louis79 dis-
missed the residences' actions, holding that the cases were not ripe
because the residences did not exhaust their administrative remedy
of seeking a special use permit. Although the Seventh and Eighth
circuits couched their decisions in terms of the doctrine of "ripe-
ness," in effect, both of these decisions required housing providers
for people with disabilities to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing a federal action.
The decisions of the Second and Fourth circuits represent the
view more consistent with the drafters of the Fair Housing Act. By
70. See Huntington Branch, NAACP, 689 F.2d at 394 n.3.
71. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 599.
72. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 597; Huntington Branch, 689 F.2d at
394 n.3.
73. 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996).
75. See Oxford House-C, 77 F.3d at 251; Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1231-32.
76. See Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1231-32.
77. See id.
78. 37 F.3d at 1233-34.
79. 77 F.3d at 253.
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their very nature, permit applications cause delays in access to
housing. Accordingly, homeowners may decline to sell or rent
their houses to people with disabilities if the sale or rental must
await the outcome of the permit process. Additionally, permit ap-
plications often subject the applicant to public scrutiny and thus
ultimately discourage people with disabilities from residing in
neighborhoods with permit requirements.80
Not all permit requirements are necessarily discriminatory.
However, the drafters of the Fair Housing Act intended that the
statute be used to vigorously promote access to housing for people
with disabilities in all residential neighborhoods. Therefore, as per-
mit requirements could discourage access to housing in residential
neighborhoods, it would appear that the drafters of the statute in-
tended that permit requirements be scrutinized in federal court at
the first instance.
It is not clear that the housing providers in Village of Palatine
and City of St. Louis were able to demonstrate that people with
disabilities needed to live in groups of unrelated people greater
than that permitted as of right by the municipalities for therapeutic
reasons because of their disabilities."' However, if a housing pro-
vider were able to show that its people with disabilities needed to
live in groups of unrelated people for therapeutic or financial pur-
poses, a permit requirement would clearly impede those people
with disabilities from having an opportunity to live in the commu-
nity. In such a circumstance, exhaustion should not be required as
the imposition of such a permit requirement would be discrimina-
tory per se.
80. See Horizon House Dev. Servs. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F.
Supp. 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that pro-
vider of housing for people with disabilities did not have to apply for variance because
procedures were too burdensome); Easter Seal Society of New Jersey v. Township of
North Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 236 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that a provider of housing
for people with disabilities did not have to apply for variance or permits before filing
action under Fair Housing Act); Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan and
Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1219-20 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding that provider
of housing for people with AIDS need not follow municipal administrative proce-
dures because of their burdensomeness and stigmatization of prospective residents).
81. Courts have noted that whether an accommodation is necessary for financial
or therapeutic reasons will be considered by a court in determining whether to require
such accommodation. See, e.g., Bryant Woods, Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605; Gamble v.
City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 307 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith & Lee Associates v. City
of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996); Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d
960, 962 (7th Cir. 1996); Brandt v. Village of Chebanse, 82 F.3d 172, 174 (7th Cir.
1996).
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As housing discrimination against people with disabilities is now
on an equal footing with housing discrimination on other bases,
analogies can be made to these types of cases. For example, if a
law had required that members of a particular race, religion, or
national origin had to apply for a permit before residing in a com-
munity, no court would have required that a member of such par-
ticular race, religion or national origin apply for a permit before
being able to challenge such a law.82 Similarly here, exhaustion
should not be required before the commencement of a Federal
action.
B. Burden of Proof
The courts are also split as to which party should have the bur-
den of proof in a reasonable accommodation case.
In Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick,83 the Third Circuit held
that the burden of proof was on the municipality to demonstrate
that it could not make a reasonable accommodation to permit
housing for people with disabilities.8 4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court followed its precedents interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act, placing the burden of proving on the defendant.85
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods Inn, Inc.
v. Howard County held that the burden of proof in a reasonable
accommodation should be on the proponent of housing because
the burden of proof in an action is usually on a plaintiff and, in its
view, the statute's text "evidences no intent to alter normal bur-
dens. ' 86 The Fifth Circuit in Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 7
had a similar view, and noted that in the Fifth Circuit, it is the
plaintiff that has the burden of proof in a case brought under the
Rehabilitation Act.88
82. See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp.
1285, 1996 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that requirement that group homes for people with
mental disabilities notify the neighborhood before their establishment was equally as
offensive as a requirement that minority persons give notice before moving into a
non-minority neighborhood). See also Epicenter of Steubenville, Inc. v. City of Steu-
benville, 924 F. Supp. 845, 851 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that the municipality's impo-
sition of a moratorium constituted discriminatory intent and that it was "like the
hoods of Klansmen masking the faces of criminals" and equated a law excluding peo-
ple with disabilities with laws excluding minorities).
83. 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996).
84. See id. at 1103.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996).
88. Id. at 177. As discussed in detail in the Second Circuit's decision in Borkowski
v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995), there is a split in circuits
19981
430 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
Generally, burdens of proof are allocated based upon which
party has the possession of the most evidence necessary to prove
the position.89 In consideration of that principle, the decisions of
the Fourth and Fifth circuits unreasonably place housing providers
with the burden of proving that their housing would not cause and
undue burden or substantial hardship on a community or that their
housing would not fundamentally alter a neighborhood.
Remembering that a reasonable accommodation case has three
elements- reasonableness, necessity, and equality- the burden of
proof for these elements should be split between the parties. As a
proponent of housing for people with disabilities knows more
about its proposed housing than the municipality, the housing pro-
ponent should be required to demonstrate why it needs an accom-
modation from an ordinance or rule, and why such an
accommodation would provide people with disabilities with an
equal housing opportunity. On the other hand, a municipality,
which would normally have more information about its own struc-
ture and finances and its neighborhoods, should bear the burden of
proof of showing that housing for people with disabilities would
cause an undue burden or hardship on the municipality.
The model for this standard is the Second Circuit's decision in
Borkowski v. Valley Central School District,90 an employment dis-
crimination case brought under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to
a reasonable accommodation theory. In Borkowski, the Second
Circuit placed the burden on the employee to show that she
needed an accommodation to retain her employment and that such
an accommodation existed to provide her with the opportunity to
continue her employment. 91 As for the employer, the Second Cir-
cuit placed the burden on it to demonstrate that the accommoda-
tion sought by the employee was unreasonable; i.e., that it would
create an undue hardship or substantial burden on the employer. 92
as to which party had the burden of proof in an employment action brought pursuant
to he Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 135-37.
89. See, e.g., Morgado v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Civil Defense Corps., 706
F.2d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that employer relying in Equal Pay Act
provision allowing pay differentials for reasons other than sex must prove entitlement
to provision's protection because such facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
employer); EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 185 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding that "general principle of allocation of proof to the party with the most ready
access to the relevant information" requires Title VII defendant to show in appropri-
ate of labor pool statistics).
90. 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995).
91. See id. at 138-39.
92. See id.
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The Borkowski court correctly recognized both the purposes of the
Rehabilitation Act and the reality of which party would have the
most access to evidence in allocating the burden of proof in a rea-
sonable accommodation case.
C. Reasonableness
Obviously, a court must consider whether an accommodation
sought by a proponent of housing for people with disabilities is
"reasonable" under the "reasonable accommodation" test.
Adopting the "reasonableness" test used under the Rehabilitation
Act, an accommodation is reasonable if it does not cause an undue
hardship or burden on a municipality or result in the fundamental
alteration of the residential nature of an area.93
Whether an accommodation to permit a particular house in a
particular neighborhood is "reasonable" must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. The following are some of decisions that have
examined whether a particular accommodation is "reasonable."
Three courts have ruled that requested accommodations for
housing for people with disabilities were reasonable and required
the provision of such accommodations. In Shapiro v. Cadman
Towers, Inc.,9 a resident of an apartment complex needed a nearby
parking space within the building complex because of her disabil-
ity. Even though the building allocated three spaces for building
staff and another parking spot for a person that did not live in the
building, the apartment complex refused to grant her a space, and
put her on a waiting list.95
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the resident, holding that it
would not be unreasonable to permit that person to have the spot
of one of the employees.96 The court held that permitting the resi-
dent to have a spot in spite of the waiting list would not cause an
undue hardship or substantial burden on the apartment complex.97
93. See Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir.
1996); Hovsons v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1104 (3d Cir. 1996); Shapiro v.
Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1995).
94. 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. See id. at 331.
96. See id. at 335-36.
97. See id. The Court cited both the HOUSE REPORT and Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis in reaching its conclusion. See id. at 334. However, the Court,
refused to determine the issue of whether the resident with a disability could have
usurped the rights of other tenants on the ground that the Court found that the resi-
dent with a disability could be accommodated without burdening any other resident.
See id. at 336.
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In Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick,98 the issue was whether a
municipality was required to permit a developer of a nursing home
for people with disabilities to build the nursing home in a residen-
tial zoning district.99 In Hovsons, the Third Circuit held that a mu-
nicipality's refusal to permit a 210-resident nursing home in a
residential neighborhood was unreasonable. 100
In ruling in favor of the nursing home, the Third Circuit noted
that granting a variance to the housing developer would not have
placed undue financial and administrative burdens on the munici-
pality, or have resulted in the imposition of an undue hardship on
the community, or have changed the resdidential character of the
area.1"1 The court noted that the residents of the nursing home
would be taxpaying members of the municipality, that the nursing
home would arrange for its own garbage collection, street mainte-
nance and snow removal, and that the nursing home would not be
using municipal emergency services to any more than area retire-
ment developments.0 2
Finally, in Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor,03 the Sixth
Circuit held that requiring a municipality to permit an adult foster
care home for nine residents in a neighborhood whose zoning only
permitted adult foster care homes for six people was not unreason-
able and directed the municipality to permit an adult foster care
home for nine people. 4 The Sixth Circuit held that the addition
of three additional residents to the neighborhood would not funda-
mentally alter the nature of the single-family neighborhood. 10 5
In reaching its conclusion that the municipality was required to
accept an adult foster care home for nine residents, the Sixth Cir-
cuit engaged in a cost-benefit analysis. The Sixth Circuit weighed
the fact that three additional people would be moving into the
neighborhood with the fact that the residents would likely not
drive and cause traffic or parking problems for the
neighborhood. 10 6
98. 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996).
99. See id. at 1098-99.
100. See id. at 1105-06.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996).
104. See id. at 785.
105. See id. at 795-96. The Court also cited the House Report and the Supreme
Court's decision in Southeastern Community College. See id. at 795.
106. See id. at 796.
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While the decisions in Shapiro, Hovsons, and Smith & Lee Asso-
ciates all resulted in services or housing being afforded to people
with disabilities and comported with the intentions of the drafters
of the statute, it could be argued these cases discriminate against
people with disabilities. A non-disabled person can move into a
community and cause an administrative and financial burden on a
municipality. However, a non-disabled person would not be sub-
ject to court scrutiny or forced to leave a community if that person
did cause an administrative and financial burden on a municipality
or fundamentally alter a residential neighborhood provided that
said person's actions were not illegal.
On the other hand, even under the most liberal interpretations
of the Fair Housing Act, housing for people with disabilities can be
excluded if they create an administrative and financial burden on a
municipality or fundamentally alter a residential neighborhood.
Whether people with disabilities who do create an administrative
and financial burden or fundamentally alter a residential neighbor-
hood should have the same right to do so as non-disabled people
may well be the subject of future litigation.
Two cases have ruled that proposed accommodations for housing
for people with disabilities were unreasonable. °7 In Bryant Woods
Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, °8 the Fourth Circuit ruled that a re-
quest to increase housing for elderly people with disabilities from
eight to fifteen people was unreasonable because a member of the
municipal planning board observed vehicles parked "all over the
place and also in the driveway."'0 9
The Fourth Circuit's decision view of "reasonableness" in Bryant
Woods Inn is too constrained and does not comport with the inten-
tions of the drafters of the statute. 10 Even if it were observed that
there were vehicles "all over the place and also in the driveway,"
the Court's decision failed to consider how often such parking
problems occurred. Likewise, other cited problems such as mini-
mal frontage of the site and the comparison of the size of the site
with other group homes of similar size do not necessarily demon-
strate that an accommodation here would have been unreasonable.
Moreover, the court failed to address the fact that a related fam-
ily of fifteen non-disabled people could have moved into the house
107. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 597; Brandt, 82 F.3d at 172.
108. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 604-06.
109. Id.
110. Yet, the court does acknowledge the HOUSE REPORT and the dictates of
Southeastern Community College v. Davis. See id. at 603.
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in question. If fifteen non-disabled related people lived at the resi-
dence in spite of its minimal frontage and the size of other housing
in the community for fifteen people, then why was it unreasonable
to permit fifteen disabled people at the residence?
In Brandt v. Village of Chebanse,11a the Seventh Circuit held that
a municipality's denial of a variance to build a four-unit house in
an area zoned for single families was not unreasonable because of
the "loss of whatever tranquility single-family zoning offers to a
neighborhood.""12  However, the Court's decision failed to de-
scribe in detail how construction of the four-unit house would in-
crease the potential for noise, and did not consider that a large
family in a single family house could have the same or greater im-
pact noise.
In determining that various housing proposals for people with
disabilities were unreasonable, the courts in both Bryant Woods
Inn and Brandt made factually unsupported assumptions that hous-
ing for people with disabilities would be more deleterious for the
community than housing for non-disabled people. Such assump-
tions were in conflict with the intent of the drafters of the statute.
D. Necessity
The "reasonable accommodation" prong of the statute requires
that an accommodation sought "be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.""' 3 Considering
that the statute was intended to increase access to housing for peo-
ple with disabilities, the "necessary" clause should simply mean
that if it is necessary to lift a barrier to permit housing, the barrier
must be lifted." 4
For example, in Smith & Lee Associates v. City of Taylor, m5 the
Sixth Circuit found that a requested accommodation to permit nine
unrelated people with disabilities to live in a residence was "neces-
111. 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 175.
113. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
114. In Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604, the court equated this prong to a "cau-
sation requirement." However, in United States v. California Mobile Home Park
Management Company, 107 F.3d 1374, 1381 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997), the court noted that in
cases where zoning barriers impede housing for people with disabilities, "causation
poses no independent hurdle" for housing providers because "city policies directly
interfere with use and enjoyment because they prevent the housing from being built."
See also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd,
30 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that no nexis need be demonstrated between the
barrier to the proposed housing and the disability of the residents).
115. 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996).
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sary" because there was a demonstrated need for the housing and
that it was necessary to permit nine residents rather than the six
permitted by the ordinance for financial reasons. 1 6
However, several circuit courts have used the "necessary" clause
as a barrier to housing for people with disabilities. 7 Such an in-
terpretation of the clause conflicts with both the intention of the
drafters of the Fair Housing Act and the mandate of the Supreme
Court that the statute be given a "generous construction."
For example, in Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock,11 8 the Fifth
Circuit held that the municipality did not have to make a reason-
able accommodation to a housing provider to permit it to house
two more residents with disabilities because the provider failed to
allege or prove that the number of people it sought to house was a
"critical number" to make housing sought economically feasible.11 9
However, unlike the Sixth Circuit in Smith & Lee, the Fifth Circuit
viewed the case from the point of view of the provider rather than
the person with a disability. Even if the number of people in
Elderhaven was not the "critical number" to make housing sought
economically feasible, the Fifth Circuit's decision allowed a munici-
pality to make housing unavailable to two people with disabilities.
For those two people, an accommodation was certainly
'"necessary."
Some courts have suggested that an accommodation is not neces-
sary when people with disabilities could live elsewhere. For exam-
ple, in Brandt 20 the Seventh Circuit held that an accommodation
to build four-unit housing for people with disabilities in a single-
family zone was not "necessary" because the developer could have
built his four-family unit elsewhere.121
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Brandt ignores the language of
the statute stating that an accommodation may be necessary to af-
ford such person equal opportunity "to use and enjoy a dwell-
116. Id. at 795-96.
117. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605; Elderhaven v. City of Lubbock, 98
F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996); Brandt, 82 F.3d at 175.
118. 98 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. See id. at 179. The court in Elderhaven seemed to be impressed by the city's
past record regarding housing for people with disabilities. See id. at 178. While a
municipality's past record with regard to housing for people with disabilities may be
relevant in an intentional discrimination case, it should have no relevance regarding
whether a particular accommodation sought is reasonable and necessary to provide an
equal opportunity.
120. 82 F.3d 172 (7th Cir. 1996).
121. Id. at 175.
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ing. "122 "To use and enjoy a dwelling" logically would mean to use
and enjoy a particular dwelling, and not some other configuration
of the dwelling or a dwelling at another location. The latter con-
cept, that a municipality could prevent housing for people with dis-
abilities in some areas by permitting such housing in other areas, is
particularly offensive. As a municipality certainly could not desig-
nate limited areas of a municipality for people of a particular race,
religion, or national origin, it should not designate a limited area of
a municipality for housing for people with disabilities. 123
Perhaps the decision on the "necessity" of an accommodation
that is most at variance with the intent of the statute's drafters and
the Supreme Court's "generous construction" of the statute is the
Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Bryant Woods Inn.124 The issue
before the Fourth Circuit there was whether the municipality
should grant a variance to permit a housing provider to expand its
residence for people with disabilities from eight to fifteen.125 The
court held that an accommodation was not "necessary" because: a)
other group homes in the municipality housed eight people; b)
there was no evidence that group homes were not financially or
therapeutically viable with only eight people; and c) there were va-
cancies in other group homes in the municipality. 26
In viewing the question of "necessity" from the point of view of
the housing provider, rather than the point of view of the person
122. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
123. In contrast, see Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp.
1329, 1344 (D.N.J. 1991), which noted in rejecting a municipality's argument that it
could exclude a housing for people with a disability in a given area because it permit-
ted such housing in other areas that "anti-discrimination laws are designed to prevent
just such discriminatory segregation." See also Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975,
982-84 n.12 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a municipality can exclude housing people
with disabilities from some areas if it permits such housing in other neighborhoods).
In Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit
again mused over whether the question as to whether the "reasonable accommoda-
tion" clause gives people a right to reside at a particular dwelling or within a particu-
lar municipality, implying that the municipality may have the right to restrict housing
for people with disabilities to certain areas. Again, the answer to this should be sim-
ple. The drafters of the Fair Housing Act intended that people with disabilities have
the right to reside in housing of their choice, and not housing in some part of the
municipality they may not choose. See also City of Edmonds v. Washington State
Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994), affd, 514 U.S. 725 (1995); Ox-
ford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(citing courts that held that the Fair Housing Act gave people with disabilities right to
live in housing of their choice).
124. 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997).
125. See id. at 605.
126. See id.
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with a disability seeking to live in a particular residence,127 the
court's decision on "necessity" in Bryant Woods Inn was errone-
ous. As a result of the municipality's determination, seven people
with disabilities were prevented from living in a particular resi-
dence, regardless of whether other group homes housed eight peo-
ple, whether group homes were financially or therapeutically viable
with only eight people, or whether there were vacancies in other
group homes in municipality. Since the municipality's determina-
tion barred seven people from living in a particular group home,
the court should have determined that an accommodation was nec-
essary for those seven people, and then proceeded to determine
the reasonableness of the accommodation sought.
E. Equality
An accommodation sought must be necessary "to afford such
person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ' 128 As the
Sixth Circuit correctly held in Smith & Lee Associates v. City of
Taylor,129 the "equal opportunity" clause prohibits the exclusion of
people with disabilities from zoning neighborhoods or municipal
decisions "that will give disabled people less opportunity to live in
certain neighborhoods than people without disabilities.' 130 Simi-
127. The issue is not one of standing, but rather one of perception. Housing prov-
iders clearly have the right to commence actions under the Fair Housing Act. See,
e.g., Horizon House Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton,
804 F. Supp. 683, 692-93 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993); Stewart B.
McKinney Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1208-
09 (D. Conn. 1992).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994).
129. 102 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 795. The court also correctly noted that the phrase "equal opportunity"
under the Fair Housing Act involves "achieving equal results, not just formal equal-
ity" and an "affirmative duty." Id. at 795; see also Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that the Fair Housing
Act required an affirmative action). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods
Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Maryland, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997), rejected the no-
tion that the Fair Housing Act intended to require "equal results." See id. at 604. The
court cited to Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1985), where the Supreme
Court held that if a state reduced a benefit equally to both people with disabilities and
non-disabled people, such action did not violate the Rehabilitation Act even though it
had effectively had a greater impact on people with disabilities. See Bryant Woods
Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605. However, the Bryant Woods Inn application of Alexander is
erroneous. See id. The decision of the municipality in Bryant Woods Inn resulted in
the exclusion of residents from the municipality, while the decision of the defendant
state in Alexander did not result in an exclusion of services or denial of access. In-
deed, the Supreme Court noted that it based its decision on the fact that there was no
denial of access or exclusion from benefits involved in its case. Alexander, 469 U.S. at
309.
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larly, the Seventh Circuit in Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson13 1
noted that where the issue is whether a number of unrelated peo-
ple with disabilities can live in a single-family residence, "equal op-
portunity" can be demonstrated by showing that living in unrelated
groups of a particular size is therapeutic and also is the only way
most of the residents can live in a single-family home. 132
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Bryant Woods Inn held that a
request for a variance to expand a group home from eight to fif-
teen people would not provide an equal opportunity to the pro-
vider's residents but instead a financial advantage to the
provider. 33 Again, the Fourth Circuit wrongfully viewed the Fair
Housing Act through the eyes of the housing provider rather than
the eyes of the person with a disability. If people with disabilities
need to live in an unrelated group for therapeutic reasons, a depri-
vation of that right would deny them an equal opportunity to re-
side in a community. If fifteen related people can live in a
residence, then inequality would exist if fifteen unrelated people
could not live in the residence if they needed to live together be-
cause of their disability.
It has been argued that ordinances limiting group living such as
fraternities and sororities constitute "equality" because it is appli-
cable to both people with disabilities and non-disabled people. 34
However, non-disabled people do not need to reside in fraternities
and sororities to be able to live in a residential neighborhood,
while people with disabilities, because of their disabilities, may
need to live in a group setting in order to be able to live in a resi-
dential zone. 35
IV. Recommendations
As was the case in the earlier district court "reasonable accom-
modation" cases, the focus in a "reasonable accommodation" case
should be on whether a proposed accommodation is "reasonable."
The issues of "necessity" and "equality" should be relatively easy
to resolve in most cases. If a zoning barrier remains between a
person with a disability and the housing the person desires, an ac-
131. 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 1969).
132. See id. at 963.
133. Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d at 605.
134. See Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 982-84 (11th Cir. 1992).
135. See Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that recovering alcoholics and substance abusers need to live in group
setting to encourage recovery).
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commodation is "necessary" to remove the barrier. If a person
with a disability, because of the disability, cannot live in housing or
an area that a person without a disability can live in, inequality of
opportunity has been proven. As the Seventh Circuit noted in
Erdman v. City of Fort Atkinson, 36 the amount of proof necessary
to show that equal opportunity does not exist "is slight," and, ordi-
narily, "inequality is fairly obvious."'1 3 7
Therefore, the key question in a "reasonable accommodation"
case should be whether a proposed accommodation is "reason-
able." Since the municipality possesses the most information
about its services, finances, and neighborhoods, it should be forced
to bear the burden of proving that a reasonable accommodation
cannot be made. Placing the burden on the housing provider to
demonstrate that the municipality would not suffer an undue hard-
ship or burden or would not substantially alter the nature of a resi-
dential neighborhood would illogically force the provider to have
to prove a negative fact. Similarly, courts should not require hous-
ing providers to exhaust administrative remedies which are gener-
ally barriers to housing that the drafters of the statute sought to
eliminate.
While some courts have placed a more cramped reading on the
"reasonable accommodation" test than necessary, they have pro-
vided a more expansive reading of the "facial discrimination" stan-
dard, as well as the provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act barring discrimination by zoning authorities against people
with disabilities. These readings are more consistent with inten-
tions of the drafters of the statutes, and correctly consider the im-
pact on people with disabilities, rather than the impact on housing
providers.
For example, in Larkin v. State of Michigan Department of Social
Services,'38 the Sixth Circuit considered the question of whether a
state statute placed a spacing requirement between group homes
for people with disabilities violated the Fair Housing Act.139 The
Sixth Circuit held that the statute was facially discriminatory in vio-
lation of the statute, stating that a statute could only survive a chal-
lenge if it were "warranted by the unique and specific needs and
136. 84 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 1996).
137. Id. at 963.
138. 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996).
139. See id. at 288-89.
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abilities of those handicapped persons."14' Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit in Bangerter v. Orem City Corporation14 1 held that an ordi-
nance requiring a certain level of supervision in residences for peo-
ple with disabilities would violate the statute unless it was
necessary to satisfy the unique and special needs of the people to
whom applied.' 42
Both the Larkin and Bangerter decisions are significant because
they considered the needs of people with disabilities in determining
the validity of statutes. Similarly, in reasonable accommodation
cases, courts should consider the needs of people with disabilities
in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable and nec-
essary to provide an equal opportunity for housing.
Finally, in Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White
Plains,43 the Second Circuit held that Title II of the Americans
With Disabilities Act applied to zoning ordinances and that a zon-
ing decision barring an alcohol and drug-dependency treatment
center violated the Act. 144 If courts continue to interpret the "rea-
sonable accommodation" prong of the Fair Housing Act in a re-
strictive fashion, housing providers should look to the Americans
With Disabilities Act for relief.
The Fair Housing Act was aimed at removing barriers to housing
for people with disabilities. The restrictive interpretation placed
upon the "reasonable accommodation" test by several courts only
creates new barriers to housing for people with disabilities not in-
tended by either the drafters of the statute or the Supreme Court.
The Court held in City of Edmonds, the statute should receive a
''generous construction" to remove unnecessary barriers to housing
for people with disabilities.
140. Id. at 290. The court also cited to the House Report. Id. at 285. The court
rejected two decisions by the Eighth Circuit: Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St.
Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991), and Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that facially discrim-
inatory laws lacking a malevolent motive do not constitute intentional discrimination
and that facially discriminatory laws must be upheld if they merely are rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government objective). See Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290.
141. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See id. at 1503-05.
143. 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997).
144. See id. at 49. Unlike the Fair Housing Act, a provider can prevail under the
Americans With Disabilities Act without proof of either a malevolent motive or a
facially discriminatory ordinance, or that a particular accommodation is "necessary."
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Conclusion
In enacting the Fair Housing Act, Congress intended to remove
land use barriers to housing for people with disabilities. The
Supreme Court recognized this intent when it refused to exempt a
land use restriction in City of Edmonds. However, more recent
federal cases have wrongfully interpreted the language of the stat-
ute in ways that create new barriers for housing for people with
disabilities. As the language of the statute can be easily inter-
preted in a manner which provides access to housing for people
with disabilities, the cases placing a restrictive reading on the lan-
guage of the statute wrongfully conflict with the intentions of the
drafters of the statute.
AS'
